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C.: NUL TIEL Corporation a Plea in Bar
EDITORIAL NOTES

"accidental" discussed. One case"9 arose in 1916, before the
amendment, so the problem was not involved. It is not apparent
when the facts in the other case21 occurred. Inasmuch as the court
used the text of the act in the Code Supplement of 191821 they
probably took place prior to the amendment. At any rate, it seems
clear that the court never had the point before it. The question is,
therefore, still an open one upon which it is desirable that the
legislature express itself clearly.
-G. E. 0.

NUL TIEL

A PLEA IN BAR.-At common law, comprehensively speaking, all defensive matter is pleaded either (1)
in bar of the action or (2) in abatement or suspension of the action.
Since in West Virginial the "parol" will no longer "demur" on
account of infancy,2 the members of the profession ordinarily speak
only of pleas in bar and pleas in abatement, using the latter term to
cover pleas to the jurisdiction. It is usual to state that defensive
matter which bars the very right of action, and therefore all possible actions in which the.right might be asserted, should be pleaded
in bar; and that matter which, ignoring the right, merely abates
the particularaction to which the plea is filed should be pleaded in
abatement. So far, very well. But a moment of reflection brings
the realization that a right of action may be considered as barred
with reference to any one of three different elements which are always inherent in every right of action: (1) the right itself; (2) the
party entitled to assert the right; (3) the party against whom it
may be asserted. In other words, it is possible to classify pleas in
bar as (1) those going to the subject matter of the action, and (2)
those going to the person. Whether it is appropriate to do so is another question. On the other hand, a typical plea in abatement
undertakes to interpose a bar with reference to neither the subject
matter nor the person, but merely undertakes to stop the action.
Courts are agreed that matter extinguishing the-right in so far as
it reposes in the subject matter. of the action should be pleaded in
bar. Likewise, it is conceded that matter which will not prevent
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0 Zinn v. Cabot, 106 S. E. 427 (W. Va. 1921).
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the same person in the same capacity from asserting the same subject matter against the same defendant in the same capacity in another action should be pleaded in abatement. But with reference
to that defensive matter which, ignoring the subject matter in
which the right reposes, merely attacks the plaintiff's capacity to
sue, or the defendant's capacity to be sued, not only in the action
at bar but in all actions, as might have been expected, there is much
confusion and contrariety in the decisions. Some courts, emphasizing the fact that such matter does not determine the question of
the defendant's or some defendant's ultimate liability, say that
such matter is true matter in abatement and should be so pleaded.'
Other courts, realizing that such matter effectively bars all actions
for or against a party in a particular capacity, have looked upon
pleas asserting it as pleas in bar.4 Still others, conceding that the
problem is susceptible of alternative solutions, and conceivably attempting to reach a result which will dispense with technical distinctions, have held that a defendant has the option to plead such
5
matter either in abatement or in bar.
Although there is no substantial objection to permitting the
option, which in practical effect extends no broader rights to the
defendant than if he were confined to a plea in bar, it is believed
that true legal theory points to a plea in bar as the appropriate
method of asserting such defenses. Such defensive matter effectually bars the particular plaintiff either in the particular defective capacity in which he sues as plaintiff or in the particular defective capacity in which he sues the defendant; and it should not be
forgotten that any plea in bar can bar an action only with reference
to the particular parties to the action in which it is filed. It is not
a bar against the world; it is not a bar against a third party who
may assert a cause of action against the defendant based upon
the same facts; nor is it a bar against a different defendant. Essentially, the same person suing in a different capacity is a different
plaintiff, and the same person defending in a different capacity is a
different defendant. No particular cause of action can exist without a specific plaintiff, a specific right and a specific defendant.

9

CYc. 171, and cases cited; 1 R. C. L. § 53, as to nul tiel corporation, sea
10 Cyc. 1356 et. seq.; 1 C. J. 115; 14A C. J. 828; 5 STANDARD Paoc. 645 et seq.,
655 et seq.
See same citations.
' Idem; Boston Type, eto. Co. v. Spooner, 5 Vt. 93 (1833).
The dual nature of
a

plea asserting such matter is recognized

in

Taylor v. Virginia-Pocahontas

Co.. 78 W. Va. 455. 88 S. E. 1070 (1916).
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It takes no broad stretch of imagination to say that, if a differeit party sues, or a different party is sued-and different party
may include the same person in a different capacity-the right
asserted in the second suit is a different right, although based upon
the same subject matter. Concededily, matter extinguishing the
right bars the plaintiff. Then why does not matter barring the
plaintiff's or defendant's capacity extinguish the right? If A sues
B for libel, ought there to be any difference in effect between denying the existence of the libel and denying the existence of A or B?
In West Virginia, seemingly the Supreme Court of Appeals has
usually looked upon this matter in controversy as constituting
proper matter for a plea in bar.' Prior to Acts of 1882,J under the
general issue, a plaintiff was compelled to prove the existence of a
corporation or partnership, whether plaintiff or defendant, a fact
clearly indicating that the non-existence of such a party was considered matter in bar." By Acts of 1882, denial of the existence of
a corporation or a partnership was required to be under oath.9
The same statute which prescribed the necessity of the oath likewise
authorized a special form of plea. As original propositions, two
questions seem fairly to be suggested by this statute: (1) Is the
special plea prescribed by the statute exclusive of all other pleas?
(2) Is it a plea in bar or a plea in abatement? That there has not
been a uniform consensus of legal thought upon the subject is indicated by the fact that Mr. Hogg has treated these pleas as pleas
in bar ;19 while Judge Kittle classifies them as pleas in abatement."
Judge Kittle can find much respectable authority for his position
in the decisions of other states. " Likewise, it may be said that,
since, if these special pleas are pleas in bar, they amount to the
general issue, the legislature must have meant them to be pleas in
abatement. On the other hand, it has been the recognized practice
in this state and in Virginia to permit a defendant to deny the ex;
* In Taylor v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co.. supra, the court virtually recognizes
the plea of ne unques administrator as a plea in bar which view is in accord with
the recent line of decisions beginning with Austin v. Calloway, 73 W. Va. 231, 80
S. E. 361, ANN. CAs. 1916U, 112 (1913), holding that the appointment and qualification of a personal representative are issuable facts and should be alleged in the
declaration, Where a receiver is sued, tOe general issue compels proof of the appointment of the receiver. Hudkins v. Bush, 69 W. Va. 194, 71 S. E. 106 (1911).
But see HoGG, PLEADING AND Foams, 165, and cases cited.
7 W. VA. CODE, c. 125. §41.
8 Anderson v. Kanawha Coal Co., 12 W. Va. 526 (1878) ; Central Land Co. v.
Calhoun. 16 W. Va. 361 (1880).
9 Note 7, supra.
20 HoaO, PLEADING AN Fons, 420, 421; ider, 699 (index) ; iJem, 165.
11 KrriLEx, MoDERN LAW or ASsUmpSIT, 544.
1

Note 3, supra.
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ecution of a writing either by the general issue supported by an
affidavit, or by a special verified plea, and the latter plea has never
been suspected of being a plea in abatement. 13 Hence the legislature may very well be understood as having intended merely expressly to authorize a similar practice in denying the existence of
a partnership or a corporation. Moreover, the position taken by
Mr. Hogg is in harmony with the attitude of the Supreme Court
prior to the enactment of the statute.
In a recent case, the Supreme Court has definitely decided that
these statutory pleas are pleas in bar, by way of refusing to permit
a trial on the general issue after a verdict in favor of the defendant
on a plea of nut tiel corporation. 14 In the same case, the court
suggested that defenses of nut tiel corporation and nut tiel partnership may be asserted under the general issue, provided that an
affidavit be filed with the general issue dejiying the ex~stence
of the corporation or the partnership.
-L.C.
3 HOGG, PLEADING AND FORMs, 178; BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 99-100.
Tower v. whip, 53 W. Va. 158, 44 S. E. 179, 63 L. R. A. 937 (1903).
u Mitch v. United Mine Workers of America, 104 S. E. 292 (W. Va. 1920).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss4/9

4

